Abstract-Recent work on the foundational underpinnings of black-box optimization has begun to uncover a rich mathematical structure. In particular, it is now known that an inner product between the optimization algorithm and the distribution of optimization problems likely to be encountered fixes the distribution over likely performances in running that algorithm. One ramification of this is the "No Free Lunch" (NFL) theorems, which state that any two algorithms are equivalent when their performance is averaged across all possible problems. This highlights the need for exploiting problem-specific knowledge to achieve better than random performance. In this paper, we present a general framework covering most optimization scenarios. In addition to the optimization scenarios addressed in the NFL results, this framework covers multiarmed bandit problems and evolution of multiple coevolving players. As a particular instance of the latter, it covers "self-play" problems. In these problems, the set of players work together to produce a champion, who then engages one or more antagonists in a subsequent multiplayer game. In contrast to the traditional optimization case where the NFL results hold, we show that in self-play there are free lunches: in coevolution some algorithms have better performance than other algorithms, averaged across all possible problems. However, in the typical coevolutionary scenarios encountered in biology, where there is no champion, the NFL theorems still hold.
I. INTRODUCTION

R
ECENT work has started to uncover the mathematical foundations of black-box optimization, i.e., the foundations of optimization scenarios where one does not know the "objective/fitness" function to be optimized, but can only work with samples of that function [5] , [9] , [10] , [14] , [17] , [21] - [23] , [28] , [31] . In particular, it is now known that an inner product between one's black-box optimization algorithm and the distribution of likely objective functions fixes the distribution over likely performances in running that algorithm. An immediate implication of this result is the "No Free Lunch" (NFL) theorems. These establish the equivalent performance of all optimization algorithms when averaged across all possible problems. 1 As an example of these theorems, recent work has explicitly constructed objective functions where random search outperforms evolutionary algorithms [26] . There has also been much work extending these early results to different types of Manuscript received August 11, 2004 optimization (e.g., to multiobjective optimization [7] ). The web site: www.no-free-lunch.org offers a list of recent references. However, all this previous work has been cast in a manner that does not cover repeated game scenarios where the "objective function" for one player or agent can vary based on the response of another player. In particular, the NFL theorems do not cover such scenarios. These game-like scenarios are usually called "coevolutionary" since they involve the behaviors of more than a single agent or player [13] .
One important example of coevolution is "self-play," where from the system designer's perspective, the players "cooperate" to train one of them as a champion. That champion is then pitted against an antagonist in a subsequent multiplayer game. The goal is to train that champion player to perform as well as possible in that subsequent game. (For example, in checkers and chess, see [4] and [15] .)
Early work on coevolutionary scenarios includes [2] , [16] , and [29] . More recently, coevolution has been used for problems that on the surface appear to have no connection to a game (for an early application to sorting networks, see [19] ). Coevolution in these cases sometimes enables escape from poor local optima in favor of better local optima.
We will refer to all players other than the one of direct attention as that player's "opponents," even when, as in self-play, the players can be viewed as cooperating. Sometimes when discussing self-play, we will refer to the specific opponent to be faced by a champion in a subsequent game-an opponent not under our control-as the champion's "antagonist."
In this paper, we present a mathematical framework, generalized optimization (GO), that covers both traditional optimization and coevolutionary scenarios. GO also covers other scenarios such as multiarmed bandits. We then use GO to explore the differences between traditional optimization and coevolution. We find dramatic differences between the traditional optimization and coevolutoin scenarios. In particular, unlike the fundamental NFL result for traditional optimization, in the self-play version of coevolution there are algorithms that are superior to other algorithms for all problems. However, in the typical coevolutionary scenarios encountered in biology, where there is no champion, the NFL theorems still hold, i.e., uniformly averaged over all objective functions, all algorithms perform identically.
Section II summarizes the previous NFL work that we extend, and Section III motivates these extensions. Section IV presents the resultant extended NFL framework, GO, and provides example illustrations of GO. Section V applies GO to self-play, and Section VI demonstrates that NFL results need not apply in this case. In Section VII, we discuss the role of the antagonist's intelligence in such free lunch results. We conclude in Section VIII.
II. BACKGROUND
Motivated by the myriad heuristic approaches to black-box combinatorial optimization, researchers have sought insight into how best to match optimization algorithms to problems. The importance of this task was highlighted in [36] . We review the approach taken in that paper as it forms the starting point for our extensions.
We consider search over a finite space and assume that the associated space of possible "fitness" or "objective function" values is also finite. The sizes of the spaces are and , respectively. The space of possible fitness functions contains possible mappings from to . A particular mapping in is indicated as . All of the results mentioned in this section be extended to the case of stochastic fitness functions specified by conditional distributions rather than single-valued functions from to . (This is explicitly demonstrated below when we introduce GO, the generalized version of the original NFL framework.) However, for pedagogical simplicity here, we restrict attention to single-valued 's. The goal of one's "black-box optimization/search algorithm" is to find an that has a good value of , using only samples of . In particular, we are interested in the performance of such algorithms when averaged across some distribution of single-valued fitness functions. The mathematical formalization of what we mean by "black-box optimization/search algorithm" in [36] is motivated by iterative algorithms like evolutionary algorithms, simulated annealing, and tabu search. All such algorithms sample elements of the search space (i.e., select an ), and evaluate the fitness of that sample. New 's are selected based upon previously sampled 's and the associated fitness values. At an iteration at which a total of distinct 's have been examined, we write those 's and associated fitness values as an ordered set of distinct "configurations":
. We refer to this ordered set of configurations as a "sample". 2 Configurations in are ordered according to the time at which the algorithm sampled them. Thus, is the th sampled value, and is the associated fitness value. The ordered sets of all and values are indicated as and , respectively. Algorithms are compared on the basis of the samples that they generate. It is important to note that the 's in must all be distinct. This means that algorithms are compared only on the basis of the unique 's they have examined. This does not mean that algorithms that do revisit 's (as evolutionary algorithms and simulated annealing typically do) cannot be compared. Rather, it means they must be compared based on the number of distinct 's they have examined. The fact that we are comparing them that way means that for the purposes of our analysis, we can treat them as though each point they visit is distinct. Further discussion of this point is found in [36] .
Based upon these definitions an algorithm is a (perhaps nondeterministic) mapping from a set of samples to a new (i.e.
, not yet visited) point in the search space, . 2 This set was called a trace in [30] .
That mapping is specified by the probability distribution defined over which gives the probability of the algorithm selecting at time . To ensure that search space points are not revisited, we require zero probability on previously visited 's. Thus, for all . 3 The algorithm begins with the selection of a starting configuration as specified by an initial distribution . Combining these considerations, an algorithm is a specification of the probability distributions , etc. (This definition of a search algorithm has been reused by others in the special case where the mapping was assumed to be deterministic, e.g., in [30] .) With every visit to a new search space element the set of samples is extended from to include the new and its fitness, i.e., so that and . While covering many classes of algorithms (like simulated annealing, evolutionary algorithms, tabu search, etc.), not all algorithms are of this type. In particular, algorithms that use more information about the objective function than just the samples are not of this type (e.g., enumerative algorithms like branch and bound). The results presented here do not necessarily apply to algorithms outside the class we consider.
The efficacy of a search algorithm is assessed with a performance measure , which is a function of all the fitness values seen by the algorithm by step . Examples of such a measure are the best fitness value seen so far, the ending fitness value, etc. (It is important to note that use of such a measure of performance differs from the typical concerns of computationally complexity. We are not concerned with run times or memory issues.) The performance of an algorithm after having visited distinct 's, averaged over a class of optimization problems specified with a distribution , is . When is uniform over any set of functions which is closed under permutations, 4 then it can be shown that is independent of [28] , [30] , [36] . Thus, the expected performance of any pair of algorithms is equal under that type of average. This is an example of an NFL result. The most general form for for which such NFL results hold is derived in [11] , [21] .
Reference [36] considers many extensions of the basic NFL results. It is shown there that algorithms may be distinguished once we look beyond simple average performances. In addition, one can derive results independent of the distribution over optimization functions [23] . Our purpose here is to extend the framework discussed above to coevolutionary settings where there is more than a single player. As we shall see, the extension we arrive at, GO, addresses many problems of interest in both evolutionary and coevolutionary optimization. Before presenting the details of GO, we motivate its extensions through consideration of an idealized self-play optimization problem, and the -armed bandit.
III. MOTIVATION
In this section, we present two separate motivations for our generalization of the original NFL framework into GO.
A. Self Play
We can view the NFL framework reviewed above as a "game" in which a single player is trying to determine what "move" it should make to optimize . As an example of another type of problem we would like to study, we consider self-play. This extension involves moves of more than one player, even though there is still a single and . For example, in the case of two players the fitness function depends upon the "moves" of both players, indicated as and .
To illustrate this consider a multistage game involving the two players [1] , [18] , such as checkers [4] . Have the players be computer programs. In this setting, the moves and are the two complete computer programs that compete with each other, rather than the plays they make at any particular stage. These programs, fixed at the beginning of the game, specify each player's entire strategy of what play to make in response to what set of preceding observations. It is these programs that are of interest. 5 In this case, reflects the performance of one particular one of the players. As another example, might represent an algorithm to sort a list, and a mutable set of lists to be sorted. The payoff here reflects the ability of the algorithm to sort the lists in .
In self-play, we fix attention on the payoff to one of the two players, the "champion," with the other player being the "opponent." A fitness function gives the reward to the champion (e.g., for a pair of moves in which it wins, 0 for an indeterminate or drawing pair, and for a losing pair). Now, concatenate the moves of our player and the opponent into a single joint point . The mathematical advantage of doing this is that it means we will not need to generalize the definition of fitness functions when we extend the NFL framework into GO; the fitness function remains a mapping from into . Now, however, is the space of joint (champion, opponent) game moves.
Generalizing from the two-player version of self-play, we can have several players compete in a tournament, and from the results of that tournament, we select a single best player. That best player constitutes the champion, who will compete against an antagonist in a subsequent game. The goal is to design the tournament to produce the champion with the best possibility of beating the antagonist. We would like to assess the efficacy of various such tournament designs, and to see if NFL-like results hold for such designs.
When designing a self-play tournament there are two different choices to make. First, one must decide how the "training games" are selected, i.e., how each set of all the players' moves for the next round of the tournament are chosen based on the results of the preceding rounds. Second, one must decide how to use the outcomes of all those games to select the champion's move.
We use nomenclature analogous to the original NFL work to indicate how training games are selected. The distinct training games and their fitnesses are indicated as . Similarly, we parallel the original NFL work and write the probabilistic mapping that selects each new training game's moves based on the results of the preceding ones as a set of conditional distributions. We write that set of distributions as the "algorithm" , exactly as in the original NFL framework.
The second component of designing a tournament is choosing the champion's move at the end of the tournament. We indicate how that is done with a function , which maps a completed sequence of training games into the champion's move. We parameterize that champion's move as the associated subset of all joint moves consistent with it. For example, say that after our set of games our champion will take the role of the first player in a two-player subsequent game with a single antagonist. In other words, our champion is a choice of a (hopefully) optimal first player's move for that subsequent game. So, we choose that champion's move by selecting a particular value for the move of the first player in the subsequent game. Since that choice of move doesn't restrict the antagonist's responses, we indicate that move as the subset of all with , i.e., the subset . So, maps to such a subset of . (In the more general approach of Section V, is allowed to map to probability distributions over , not just to subsets of .)
How do we judge the performance of the champion when we do not know how the antagonist will act? One possibility is to measure the performance of the champion against the antagonist who performs best against that champion. If the champion plays the game according to , then this worst case measure may be written as where ranges over all possible opponent moves. Our definition of allows us to write that worst case performance more generally as . A good champion will maximize this worst possible performance.
Here, we see the first difference from the original singleplayer NFL scenario. In that original optimization setting performance is solely a function of (the observed game outcomes), independent of . Here, however, the maximin criteria has an explicit dependence on the fitness function . As we shall see, it is this dependence which will give rise to free lunches in which there can be a priori differences between algorithms.
Of course, there are other ways of quantifying the performance of the champion besides the maximin value, and in some cases those alternatives are more appropriate. In this work, we concentrate on the maximin measure, but we expect that if the performance measure depends explicitly on , then generically NFL type results will not hold. Subtleties in evaluating the performance of game-playing moves are considered in [3] , [8] , and [12] .
B. Bandit Problems
The -armed bandit problem is simple, but captures much of the essence of the critical exploration/exploitation tradeoff inherent in black-box optimization. In this problem a player is faced with choosing repeatedly between distinct real-valued stochastic processes having different means. With each selection it makes (of either process 1, process 2, , process ) the player receives a real-valued reward sampled stochastically from the process it chose. The player's goal is to maximize the total reward collected over selections. One simple strategy is to sample each process times for a total of training points, and for the remaining time steps to sample that process which has the higher empirical mean based on the points sampled from each process. An algorithm of this type was proposed (erroneously) as justification for the schema theorem of genetic algorithms [20] , [24] .
In order to allow NFL-like analyses to apply to algorithms for bandit problems, we must generalize the notion of a fitness function. In this case the fitness of any given value ( for selecting process ) is not deterministic, but stochastic, given by sampling the associated process. To capture this, we extend the definition of "fitness function" from a mapping to a mapping from , where is a space capturing probabilistic models. This is illustrated below.
IV. GENERALIZED OPTIMIZATION FRAMEWORK
As seen in the preceding pair of motivational examples, to increase the scope of NFL-like analyses, we need to make two slight extensions. First, we must broaden the definition of performance measures to allow for dependence on , and second, we need to generalize fitness functions to allow for nondeterminism. The resultant framework, GO, is closely related to the one used in the very first work on NFL, preceding the NFL results for the problem of search. This original work was the application of NFL to supervised machine learning [32] - [34] . 6 
A. Formal Specification of Generalization Optimization
We assume two spaces, and . To guide the intuition, a typical scenario might have be the joint move followed by our players in a self-play scenario, and be one of the possible probability distributions over some space of possible rewards to the champion. However, GO applies more generally.
In addition to and , we also have a fitness function
In the example where is a probability distribution over rewards, can be viewed as the specification of an -conditioned probability distribution of rewards; different 's result in different distributions over rewards. In particular, single-valued fitness functions are special cases of such an , where each -each -conditioned probability distribution-is a delta function about some associated reward value. Different such give different single-valued mappings from to rewards. The generalization of such single-valued mappings by introducing
into GO is what allows for noisy payoffs, and to allow GO to cover bandit problems.
We have a total of time steps, and represent the samples generated through those time steps as As in classic NFL, each is a particular . Each is a (perhaps stochastic) function of . For example, say 's-values of -are probability distributions over reward values. Then, could consist of the full distribution , i.e., could be the identity mapping. Alternatively, could consist of a moment of the distribution , or even a random sample of it. In general, we allow the function specifying to vary with . However, that freedom will not be exploited here. Accordingly, to minimize the notation, we will leave the space that each lives in implicit, and will also leave the function implicit; the symbol " " will not recur below. As shorthand, we will write to mean the pair . A search algorithm, (or just "algorithm" for short), is an initial distribution of the initially selected point , together with a set of separate conditional distributions for . Such an algorithm specifies which to next choose, based on the samples observed so far, for any time step . Often, as in previous NFL work, we assume that the next has not been previously seen. This is reflected as an implicit restriction on the conditional distributions .
Finally, we have a (potentially vector-valued) cost function,
, which is used to assess the performance of the algorithm. Often our goal is to find the that will maximize for a particular choice of the mapping forming the 's from the 's. This expectation is formed by averaging over any stochasticity in the mapping from 's to associated 's. It also averages over those fitness functions consistent (in the sense of Bayes' theorem) with the observed samples . (See below for examples.)
The NFL theorems concern averages over all of quantities depending on . For those theorems to hold in a GO scenario-for -averages of to be independent of the search algorithm-it is crucial that for fixed does not depend on . (We direct the reader to the original proofs of the NFL theorems; the extensions of those proofs to the GO setting is straightforward.) When that independence is relaxed, the NFL theorems need not hold. As we have seen such relaxation occurs in self-play; it is how one can have free lunches in self-play.
B. Examples of the Framework
Example 1: One example of GO is the scenario considered in the original NFL theorems. There we can identify with a distribution over , where is a subset of (for convenience, we take and countable). This allows for the treatment of noisy fitness functions, where the fitness at any value is sampled from an -dependent probability distribution.
As remarked above, deterministic fitness functions are the special case where such distributions must be delta functions. In this case the implicit mapping from to the associated is given simply by evaluating the real value has at . As an alternative formulation, for such deterministic fitness functions, we can instead define to be the same as . (Recall that need not be a space of probability distributions; that's only the choice of used for illustrative purposes.) In this case, is simply the value . In our more general version of the original NFL scenario, is a nondelta function distribution over , and the mapping to the associated is given by forming a stochastic sample of . In the scenario of the original NFL research, does not allow revisits. In addition, we take (recall the definition of the performance measure in Section II). As already noted, for NFL theorems these conditions are crucial: The cost function must not depend on , and the search algorithm must not allow revisit. Both conditions apply to the version of GO given here.
More generally, the NFL theorems apply to GO scenarios which can be cast as an instance of this example. This fact will be exploited below.
Example 2: The formal specification of two-player self-play in terms of GO is almost identical to that of the original (noisy fitness function) NFL scenario. The only formal difference between the scenarios arises in the choice of . However, the variables are interpreted differently, e.g., is now a joint move.
In self-play, we use the set of repeated games, together with any other relevant information we have (e.g., how the game against the antagonist might differ from the games heretofore), to choose the champion's move to be used in the subsequent game against the antagonist. As we have seen, the procedure for making this choice is a function mapping to a subset of . Since it measures performance of the champion's move against the antagonist, must involve this specification of the champion's move.
Formally, uses to determine the quality of the search algorithm that generated as follows:
where " " is the expected value of the distribution of rewards our champion receives for a joint move with the antagonist given by (3) where is the distribution evaluated at . This cost function is the worst possible payoff to the champion. There are several things to note about it. First, this definition of cost still applies if the number of players in any game is greater than two (the number of players just determines the dimensionality of , and the form of the function ). Also, arises nowhere in our formulation of self-play except in this specification of . Finally, note that the of self-play depends on .
Say we have a two-player self-play scenario and the antagonist has no care for any goal other than hurting our champion. Say that the antagonist is also omniscient (or at least very lucky), and chooses the which achieves its goal. Then, the expected reward to the champion is given by (2) . Obvious variants of this setup replace the worst-case nature of with some alternative, have be stochastic, etc.
Whatever variant we choose, typically our goal in self-play is to choose and/or so as to maximize , with the expectation now extending to average all possible , and all associated generated by running our algorithm. The fact that depends on means that NFL need not apply though. Examples of this are presented below, in Sections V, V-B, and VI. Example 3: Another example is the -armed bandit problem introduced for optimization by Holland [20] , and analyzed thoroughly in [24] . The scenario for that problem is identical to that of Example 1, except that there are no constraints that the search algorithm not revisit previously sampled points, , and every is a Gaussian. The fact that revisits are allowed (since typically ) means that NFL need not apply. Example 4: In the general biological coevolution scenario [6] , [25] , [35] , there is a set of "players" who change their moves from one game to the next, just like in self-play. Unlike in the self-play scenario though, in the general biological coevolution scenario, each player has an associated frequency in the population of all players, and that frequency also varies through the succession of games. This means that the two scenarios are quite different when formulated in GO. Moreover, the formulation for the general coevolution scenario involves definitions of , etc., that would appear counterintuitive if we were to interpret them the same way we do in self-play.
We formulate the general coevolution scenario in GO by having a set of agents (or agent types, or player types, or cultures, or lineages of genomes, or lineages of genes, etc.), just like in self-play. Their move spaces are written . Unlike in self-play (where there are also multiple agents' move spaces), is extended beyond the current joint move to include the joint "population frequency" value of those moves. Formally, we write (4) and interpret each as a move of agent type and each as a frequency with which agent occurs in the overall population of all players. Implicitly, all instances of agent in the population play the same move . 7 As an example, we could have each be a single agent, so that "learning" by agent corresponds to having the move of , change from one time step to the next. In this example, the population frequencies are confined to the two values . (For example, if we have no death or birth processes, then the frequencies are always .) As another example, when is a "lineage of a gene," it is not the move (i.e., the gene) that changes from one time step to the next, but the associated frequency of that move in the population. This too is accommodated in our choice of ; changes in from one time step to the next can involve changes in the joint-frequency without any changes in the joint-move. More generally, our formulation allows both kinds of changes to occur simultaneously. In addition, mutation, e.g., modification of the gene, can be captured in this GO formulation. This is done by having some 's that at certain times have zero population frequency, but then stochastically jump to nonzero frequency, representing a new agent that is a mutant of an old one.
To be more precise, for any , we interpret as 's current move. However, we interpret as 's previous population frequency, i.e., the population frequency, at the preceding time 7 Typically, u = 1 of course, though we have no need to explicitly require this here. Indeed, the formalism allows the u not to be population frequencies, but rather integer-valued population counts.
step, of the move that followed then. In other words, we interpret the component of as the population frequency at time step of the move followed by agent at , a move given by the component of . So the information concerning each agent is "staggered" across pairs of successive time steps. This is done as a formal trick, so that can give the sequence of joint population frequencies that accompanies the sequence of joint moves, as described below.
Have each be a probability distribution over the possible current population frequencies of the agents. So given our definition of , we interpret as a map taking the previous joint population frequency, together with the current joint move of the agents, into a probability distribution over the possible current joint population frequencies of the agents.
As an example, in evolutionary game theory, the joint move of the agents at any given determines the change in each one's population frequency in that time step. Accordingly, in the replicator dynamics of evolutionary game theory, takes a joint move and the values of all agents' immediately preceding population frequencies, and based on that determines the new value of each agent's population frequency. More precisely, to accommodate finite-population size effects, is that distribution over possible current population joint-frequencies, and is a sample of that distribution. In this general coevolution scenario, our choice for , which produces from , plays two roles. These correspond to its updates of the move components of and of the population frequency components of , respectively. More precisely, one of the things does is update the population frequencies from those of the previous time-step (which are stored in ) to the ones given by . This means directly incorporates those population frequencies into the components of . The other thing does, as before, is determine the joint move for time . At the risk of abusing notation, as in self-play, we can write the generation of the new move of each agent by using a (potentially stochastic and/or time-varying) function written . In sum then, an application of to a common is given by the simultaneous operation of all those distinct on , as well as the transfer of the joint population frequency from . The result of these two processes is . Note that the new joint move produced by may depend on the previous time-step's population frequencies, in general. As an example, this corresponds to sexual reproduction in which mating choices are stochastic, so that how likely agent is to mate with agent depends on the population frequencies of agents and . 8 However, in the simplest version of evolutionary game theory, the joint move is actually constant in time, with the only thing that varies in time being the population frequencies, updated in . If the agents are identified with distinct genomes, then in this version of evolutionary game theory reproduction is parthenogenic. 8 Obvious elaborations of GO allow X to include relative rewards between agents in the preceding round, as well as the associated population frequencies. This elaboration would allow mate selection to be based on current differential fitness between candidate mates, as well as their overall frequency in the population.
As always, the choice of depends on the research problem at hand. It is set by what one wishes to know about a sequence and . Typical analyses performed in population biology and associated fields have be a vector with components, one for each agent, each such component depending only on the associated agent's components of . As an example, often in population biology each component is 's population frequency at ; what one wishes to research is the population frequencies at the end of a sequence of interactions between the biological entities.
Usually, in such biological research, there is no notion of a champion being produced by the sequence of interactions and subsequently pitted against an external antagonist in a "bakeoff." (Famously, evolution is not teleological.) Accordingly, unlike in self-play, in such research there is no particular significance to results for alternative choices of that depend on . So make the approximation, reasonable in real biological systems, that 's are never revisited. Then, our coevolutionary scenario is a special case of Example 1. (More precisely, it is a special case of the choices of , etc., of Example 1.) This means that the NFL theorems hold for such choices of , under our never-revisiting approximation.
Some authors have promoted the use of the general coevolution scenario as a means of designing an entity to perform well, rather than as an analytic tool for analyzing how a biological system happens to develop. For example, this is the premise underlying much of the use of genetic algorithms for optimization. In general, whether or not NFL applies to such a use of coevolution for design will depend on the details of the design problem at hand.
For example, say the problem is to design a value that maximizes a provided function , e.g., design a biological organ that can function well as an optical sensor. Then, even if we are in the general coevolutionary scenario of interacting populations, we can still cast the problem as a special case of Example 1. In particular, for our design problem does not involve any "subsequent game against an antagonist," so is independent of . (Just like in Example 1, only depends on indirectly, through the characteristics of the population produced for . Unlike in self-play, there is no direct dependence on in .) Similarly, we can restrict search to never be revisiting.
Due to the fact that they're a special case of Example 1, the NFL theorems hold in such scenarios. The extra details of the dynamics introduced by the general biological coevolutionary process do not affect the validity of those theorems, which is independent of such details.
On the other hand, say the problem is to design an organism that is likely to avoid extinction (i.e., have a nonzero population frequency) in the years after a major change to the ecosystem. More precisely, say that our problem is to design that organism, and then, after we are done its ecosystem is subjected to that change, a change we know nothing about a priori. For this problem, the coevolution scenario is a variant of self-play; the "years after the major change to the ecosystem" constitute the "subsequent game against an antagonist." Now, it may be quite appropriate to choose a that depends directly on . In this situation NFL may not hold.
There are other ways one can express the general coevolution scenario in GO, i.e., other choices for the roles of , etc. that capture that scenario. The advantage of the one described here is how it formally separates the different aspects of the problem. plays the role of the laws of Nature which map joint moves and population frequencies to new population frequencies (e.g., the replicator dynamics). All variability in how one might update moves-crossover, mutation, etc.-are instead encapsulated in . In particular, if one wishes to compare two such update schemes, without knowing anything about ahead of time or being able to modify it, that means comparing two different 's, while is fixed and not something we can have any knowledge about.
V. APPLICATION TO SELF-PLAY
In Section III-A, we introduced a model of self-play. In the remainder of this paper, we show how free lunches may arise in this setting, and quantify the a priori differences between certain self-play algorithms.
To summarize self-play, we recall that agents (game moves) are paired against each other in a (perhaps stochastically formed) sequence to generate a set of two-player games. After distinct training games between an agent and its opponents, the agent enters a competition. Performance of the agent is measured with a payoff function. The payoff function to the agent when it plays move and it's opponent plays is written as , where is the joint move. We make no assumption about the structure of moves except that they are finite.
We define the payoff for the agent playing move independent of an opponent's reply, , as the least payoff over all possible opponent responses:
. With this criterion, the best move an agent can play is that move which maximizes (a maximin criterion) so that its performance in competition (over all possible opponents) will be as good as possible. We are not interested in search strategies just across the agent, but more generally across the joint moves of the agent and its opponents. (Note that whether that opponent varies or not is irrelevant, since we are setting its moves.) The ultimate goal is to maximize the agents performance .
We make one important observation. In general, using a random pairing strategy in the training phase will not result in a training set that can be used to guarantee that any particular move in the competition is better than the worst possible move. The only way to ensure an outcome guaranteed to be better than the worst possible is to exhaustively explore all possible responses to move , and then determine that the worst value of for all such joint moves is better than the worst value for some other move . To do this requires that is greater than the total number of possible moves available to the opponent, but even for very large , unless all possible opponent responses have been explored, we cannot make any such guarantees.
Pursuing this observation further, consider the situation where we know (perhaps through exhaustive enumeration of opponent responses) that the worst possible payoff for some move is and that another joint move with results in a payoff . In this case, there is no need to explore other opponent responses to since it must be that , i.e., is maximin inferior to . Thus, in designing an algorithm to search for good moves, any algorithm that avoids searching regions that are known to be maximin inferior (as above), will be more efficient than one that searches these regions (e.g., random search). This applies for all , and so the smarter algorithm will have an average performance greater than the dumb algorithm. Roughly speaking, this result avoids NFL implications because varying uniformly over all does not vary uniformly over all possible , which are the functions that ultimately determine performance.
In the following sections, we develop this observation further.
A. Definitions
We introduce a few definitions to explore our observation. We assume that there are moves available to an agent, and label these using
. For each such move, we assume the opponent may choose from one of possible moves forming the space . 9 Consequently, the size of the joint move space is . For simplicity, we take to be independent of so that and . If the training period consists of distinct joint moves, even with as large as , we cannot guarantee that the agent will not choose the worst possible move in the competition as the worst possible move could be the opponent response that was left unexplored for each of the possible moves.
As always, a sample of configurations (here configurations are joint moves) is a sample of distinct points from the input space , and their corresponding fitness values. For simplicity, we assume that fitness payoffs are a deterministic function of joint moves. Thus, rather than the more general output space , we assume payoff values lie in a finite totally ordered space . Consequently, the fitness function is the mapping , where is the space of joint moves. As in the general framework, a sample of size is represented as where , and and labels the samples taken. In the above definition, is the th move adopted by the agent, is the opponent response, and is the corresponding payoff. As usual, we assume that no joint configurations are revisited, and that an algorithm defined exactly as in the classic NFL case is used to generate sample sets . A particular coevolutionary optimization task is specified by defining the payoff function that is to be maximized. As discussed in [36] , a class of problems is defined by specifying a probability density over the space of possible payoff functions. As long as both and are finite (as they are in any computer implementation), this is conceptually straightforward.
There is an additional consideration in the coevolutionary setting, namely, the decision of which move to apply in the competition based upon the results of the training samples. In GO, this choice is buried in the performance measure through the function . Recall that is a 9 Note that the space of opponent moves varies with x. This is the typical situation in applications to games with complex rules (e.g., checkers). function which, given a sample of games and outcomes, returns a probability distribution over a subset of . In the case where is deterministic and selects the champion move based on , then the subset output by is . If is deterministic the natural empirical measure of the performance of the search algorithm obtained during training is Though we shall not pursue it here, it is a simple matter to allow for nondeterministic . In such cases, might stochastically define an optimal move through specification of -dependent probability density over . In this situation, performance could be defined as the weighted average where the over is over possible opponent responses to . It is also straightforward to include a distribution over opponent responses if that were known.
To summarize, search algorithms are defined exactly as in classical NFL, but performance measures are extended to depend both on and . The best for a particular and are those that maximize .
The original version of NFL (for traditional optimization) defines the performance differently because there is no opponent. In the simplest case, the performance of (recall that there is no champion-selecting procedure) might be measured as . One traditional NFL result states that the average performance of any pair of algorithms is identical, or formally, is independent of . 10 A natural extension of this result considers a nonuniform average over fitness functions. In this case, the quantity of interest is , where weights different fitness functions.
A result akin to this one in the self-play setting would state that the uniform average is independent of . However, as we have seen informally, such a result cannot hold in general since a search process with an that exhausts an opponent's repertoire of moves has better guarantees than other search processes. A formal proof of this statement is presented in Section VI. 10 Actually, far more can be said, and the reader is encouraged to consult [36] for details.
B. An Exhaustive Example
Before proving the existence of free lunches, we provide a small exhaustive example to illustrate our definitions, and to show explicitly why we expect free lunches to exist. Consider the case where the player has two possible moves, i.e.,
, the opponent has two responses for each of these moves, i.e., , and there are two possible fitness values . The 16 possible functions are listed in Table I . We see that the maximin criteria we employ gives a biased distribution over possible performance measures:
of the functions have have have , and have , where . If we consider a particular sample, say , the payoff functions that are consistent with this sample are , and the corresponding distribution over functions is . Given that any sample will give a biased sample over functions, it may not surprising that there are free lunches. We expect that an algorithm which is able to exploit this biased sample would perform uniformly better than another algorithm which does not exploit the biased sample of 's. In the next section, we prove the existence of free lunches by constructing such a pair of algorithms.
VI. CONSTRUCTION OF FREE LUNCHES
In this section, a proof is presented that there are free lunches for self-play by constructing a pair of search algorithms such that one explicitly has performance equal to or better than the other for all possible payoff functions . We normalize the possible values so that they are equal to . Thus, regardless of how values are assigned by the fitness function, our measure gives the fraction of possible fitness values having lesser or equal fitness and, thus, forms a sort of normalized ranking.
As discussed earlier, we assume that all agent moves offer the same number of possible opponent responses . We consider algorithms that explore distinct joint samples. Agent moves are labeled by and opponent responses are labeled by . For simplicity, we take . In the following section, we consider three different algorithms and show different expected performance for each of them. For those not interested in the details of the derivation of the performances a summary of results appears at the end of the section.
A. Algorithms Having Different Expected Performance
Algorithm explores the joint moves and algorithm explores the joint moves , i.e., exhausts opponent responses to , while only samples one opponent response to each of its possible moves. For the champion-selection rule, , we apply the Bayes optimal rule: select the move that has the highest expected when averaged uniformly over payoff functions consistent with the observed sample.
To start, we determine the expected performance of an algorithm that does not have the benefit of knowing any opponent responses. In this case, we average the performance , for any element , over all functions. 11 We note that for any given agent move , the possible function values at the joint moves are replicated times. The number of times that a value of is attained in the first distinct values is . Thus, the average value, which we denote , is where . This average value is obtained for all moves . In the continuum limit where , the expected value of is simply This serves as a baseline for comparison; any algorithm that samples some opponent responses has to do better than this. Next, we consider the algorithm , which exhaustively explores all opponent responses to . Because , there are possible that this algorithm might see. For each of these sample sets, , we need to determine , and the average values for each of the other moves . This average is taken over the functions that are consistent with . Of course, we have and the expected value for are all equal to (since we have no samples from any moves ). Since the champion-choosing rule maximizes the expected value of , the expected performance of for this sample set is . Averaged over all functions the expected performance of is where the sum is over all possible samples. Converting the sum over all samples into a sum over the minimum value of the sample, we find 11 Recall that jX j = l l.
If we define
, then we obtain
In the continuum limit, we have where we have recalled the expected value . We note that as the performance of algorithm is times that of . The analysis of algorithm is slightly more complex. In this case, each game occurs at a different . For any given observed set of samples, the optimal move for the agent is to choose that which has the largest fitness observed in the sample. With this insight, we observe that when summing over all functions, there are possible completions to for the remaining unobserved responses to . We must take the minimum over these possible completions to determine the expected value of . Thus, the expected payoff for algorithm when averaging over all functions is
We proceed in the same fashion as above by defining 12 (which depends on ) so that
The sum over samples is now tackled by converting it to a sum over the possible values of . The number of sequences of length having maximum value is . Moreover, if , then , and so
The continuum limit in this case is found as where is the beta function defined by . For large , the Beta functions almost cancel and the expected performance for varies as , which is only slightly better than the performance of the algorithm that does not have access to any training data.
Summary of Results: For reference, we summarize these results, and the conditions under which the results have been derived. We have considered a two-player game, where the player and opponent each have possible moves available to them. Training algorithms sample distinct games and their fitnesses. Fitness values lie uniformly between 0 and 1, and measure the normalized ranking so that, e.g., the configuration having fitness is fitter than half of all possible fitnesses. Performance is measured by the maximin criterion (i.e., the worst-case performance of the move against an opponent), and averaged over all possible fitness functions. Three algorithms were considered: random search which randomly selects distinct training games; algorithm which applies a single given move and determines the opponents best response to that move; and algorithm which samples a single opponent response to all its possible moves. In all cases, the champion move is selected with the Bayes optimal rule which chooses the move having the highest expected performance given the observed data. The expected performance in each of these algorithms is Random where . Fig. 1 plots the expected performance of , and random search as a function of (recall that ). Algorithm outperforms algorithm on average for all values of .
B. Performance Difference
Though outperforms on average, it is interesting to determine the fraction of functions, where will perform no worse than . This fraction is given by , where is the performance of algorithm on payoff function is the performance of algorithm on the same , and is a step function defined as if and , otherwise. The Bayes optimal payoff for for any given payoff function is 13 if otherwise Similarly, the performance of algorithm is given by where is the move having the highest fitness observed in the sample games . To determine the performance of the algorithms for any given , we divide into its relevant and irrelevant components as follows:
In the definition of is the move chosen by ; if does not choose move or 2, the specific value of is irrelevant. Given these definitions, the performances of the two algorithms are if otherwise 13 We have assumed arbitrarily that a will select move 2 if it does not select move 1. This choice has no bearing on the result. respectively. In summing the above expressions over , we replace the sum over with a sum over , and using the appropriate multiplicities. The resulting sums are then converted to integrals in the continuum limit and evaluated by Monte Carlo. Details are presented in Appendix A.
The results are shown in Fig. 2 , which plots the fraction of functions for which . This plot was generated using Monte Carlo samples per value.
C. Other Champion-Selection Criteria
We have shown the existence of free lunches for self-play by constructing a pair of algorithms with differing search rules and , but with the same champion-selecting rule (select the move with the highest expected ), and showed different performance. Unsurprisingly, we can construct algorithms with different expected performance that have the same search rules, but which have different champion-selecting rules. In this section, we provide a simple example of such a pair of algorithms. This should help demonstrate that free lunches are a rather common occurrence in self-play settings.
Each process of the pair we construct use the same search rule (it is not important in the present context what is), but different deterministic champion-selecting rules . 14 In both cases, a Bayesian estimate based on uniform and the at hand is made of the expected value of for each . Since we strive to maximize the worst possible payoff from , the optimal champion-selection rule selects the move that 14 The notation A is meant to be suggestive of the fact that A(d ) is the x (first) component common to all joint configurations in A(d ).
maximizes this expected value while the worst champion-selection rule selects the move that minimizes this value. More formally, if differs for the two choices of , always being higher for one of them, then differs for the two . In turn for the uniform prior . Since this differs for the two , so must . Let be a random variable representing the value of conditioned on and , i.e., it equals the worst possible payoff (to the agent) after the agent applies move and the opponent replies. In the example of Section V-B, we have and . To determine the expected value of , we need to know for uniform . Of the entire sample , only the subset sampled at is relevant. We assume that there are such values. 15 Since we are concerned with the worst possible opponent response let be the minimal value obtained over the responses to , i.e., . Since payoff values are normalized to lie between 0 and 1, . Given and is independent of and and so we indicate the desired probability as . In Appendix B, we derive the probability in the case where all values are distinct (we do so because this results in a particularly simple expression for the expected value of ) and in the case where values are not forced to be distinct. From these densities, the expected value of can be determined. In the case where values are not forced to be distinct, there is no closed form for the expectation. However, in the continuum limit where , we find (see Appendix C)
where we have explicitly noted that both and depend both on the move , as well as the training sample . As shorthand, we define . The best move given the training sample is the deterministic choice and the worst move is . In the example of Section V-B with the sample of size 2, and . As long as is not constant (which will usually be the case since the values will differ), the performances of the two champion-selecting rules will differ, and the expected performance of will be superior.
D. Better Training Algorithms
In the previous sections, we constructed Bayes-optimal algorithms in limited settings by using specially constructed deterministic rules and . This alone is sufficient to demonstrate the availability of free lunches in self-play contexts. However, we can build on these insights to construct even better (and even worse) algorithms by also determining (at least partially) the Bayes-optimal search rule , that builds out the training set, and selects the champion move. That analysis would parallel the approach taken in [24] used to study bandit problems, and would further increase the performance gap between the (best, worst) pair of algorithms.
VII. ROLE OF THE ANTAGONIST'S "INTELLIGENCE"
All results thus far have been driven by measuring performance based on . This is a pessimistic measure as it assumes that the agent's antagonist is omniscient, and will employ the move most detrimental to the agent. If the antagonist is not omniscient and cannot determine , how does this affect the availability of free lunches?
Perhaps the simplest way to quantify the intelligence of the antagonist is through the fraction of payoff values known to the antagonist. The antagonist will use these known values to estimate its optimal move . The limit corresponds to maximal intelligence where the antagonist can always determine and, as we have seen, gives free lunches. In the limit, the antagonist can only make random replies, and so that the expected performance of the agent will be the average over the antagonist's possible responses.
One way to approach this problem is to build the antagonist's bounded intelligence into the agent's payoff function and proceed as we did in the omniscient case. If is the number of joint moves, then there are possible subsets of joint moves of size . 16 We indicate the list of possible subsets as , and a particular subset by . For this particular subset, is estimated by selecting the best response out of the payoff values known to the antagonist. Of course, it may be the case that there are no samples in having the agent's move and in that case the antagonist can only select a random response. In this case, the agent will obtain the average payoff . If we assume that all subsets of size are equally likely, then the agent's payoff function against an antagonist with bounded intelligence is given by This generalization reduces to the previously assumed in the maximally intelligent case. In Table II, the  functions , and are listed for the example of Section V-B. As expected, the payoff to the agent increases with decreasing (a less intelligent antagonist). 16 We assume that is an integral multiple of 1=jXj.
However, we also observe that for the same sample , the average values are for for for , and for . For this sample, continues to beat by the same amount independent of .
VIII. CONCLUSION
We have introduced a general framework for analyzing NFL issues in a variety of contexts, GO. When applied to self-play GO establishes the existence of pairs of algorithms in which one is superior for all possible joint payoff functions . This result stands in marked contrast to similar analyzes for optimization in nonself-play settings. Basically, the result arises because under a maximin criteria the sum over all payoff functions is not equivalent to a sum over all functions . We have shown that for simple algorithms, we can calculate expected performance over all possible payoff functions and in some cases determine the fraction of functions where one algorithm outperforms another. On the other hand, we have also shown that for the more general biological coevolutionary settings, where there is no sense of a "champion" like there is in self-play, the NFL theorems still hold.
Clearly, we have only begun an analysis of coevolutionary and self-play optimization. Many of the same questions posed in the traditional optimization setting can be asked in this more general setting. Such endeavors may be particularly rewarding at this time given the current interest in the use of game theory and self-play for multiagent systems [27] .
APPENDIX
A. Performance Comparison
In this appendix, we evaluate the fraction of functions for which performs better or equal to algorithm , where and are defined, as in Section VI-B. The function is equal to 1 if where . In the above Boolean expression, we have used the condensed notation , and . It is convenient to factor the Boolean expression as
To give the fraction of functions where performs better than , this expression is to be summed over , and with appropriate multiplicities. The multiplicities are given in Table III .
In the continuum limit this sum becomes the integral where , and condition is modified to . Though this integral is difficult to evaluate analytically, it is straightforward to evaluate by Monte Carlo importance sampling of using the respective probability distributions. Samples from are obtained by sampling values from and transforming so that ; samples from are obtained via .
B. Determination of : Distinct
To determine , we first consider the case where all values are distinct and then consider the possibility of duplicate values. Though we only present the nondistinct case in the main text, we derive the distinct case here because we can obtain a closed-form expression for the probability and because it serves as a simpler introduction to the case of nondistinct .
To derive the result, we generalize from a concrete example. Consider the case where , and . A particular instantiation is presented in Fig. 3 . In this case , which is not the true minimum for responses to . The probability that is the true minimum is simply . If is not the true minimum then is found as follows.
is the fraction of functions containing values at . 17 Since the total number of possibilities consistent with the data is this fraction is
. Similarly, is because we know that the function can not contain a sample having fitness less than . 17 By d we mean the set of Y values sampled at x. the Y values actually observed during the training period. Row 3 gives the probabilities ofg assuming a uniform probability density across the f which are consistent with d . Note that unlike Fig. 3 
C. Determination of : Nondistinct
In Fig. 4 , we present another example where , and
. In this case, however, there are duplicate values. The total number of functions consistent with the data is . In this case, it is easiest to begin the analysis with the case . The number of functions having the minimum of the remaining points equal to is 1. Similarly, the number of functions having a minimum value of is . counts the number of functions where the function values can assume one of or . The accounts for the fact that 1 of these functions has a minimum value of and not . Generally, the number of functions having a minimum value of is . All will result in the minimal observed value so that the total number of functions having an observed minimum of is Thus, the probability of is
We turn now to determining the probabilities where . Of the remaining values, the probability that the minimum is is
Combining these results, we obtain the final result
Given
, the expectation value of is found as where we have canceled appropriate terms in the telescoping sum. If we define , then we can evaluate the last sum to find Though there is no closed form expression for , a recursive expansion of in terms of for is
The recursion is based upon . In the concrete case above where and , the expected value is .
D. Continuum Limit
In the limit where , we can approximate the expectation given by the sum by the integral
The prediction made by this approximation at , and is as opposed to the correct result of . However, had and , the accurate result would have been , while the approximation gives .
